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CRIMINAL LAW - HOMICIDE - FELONY-MURDER - FELON
IS CULPABLE FOR MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE UNDER
MARYLAND'S FELONY-MURDER STATUTE WHEN POLICE
OFFICER KILLS KIDNAPPED HOSTAGE USED BY FELON AS
HUMAN SHIELD. JACKSON v. STATE, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711
(1979).
At common law, when one commits homicide while perpetrating
a felony, the felony-murder rule raises that homicide to murder.' In
Maryland, when a person commits murder in the perpetration of one
or more statutorily-enumerated felonies, that murder is in the first
degree under the state's felony-murder statute.2 Maryland courts
have readily applied this statute when the felon has struck the fatal
blow.' Recently, in Jackson v. State,4 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland extended the application of the felony-murder statute to a
case in which the victim was killed, not by the felon, but accidentally
by a police officer resisting the felony. This casenote examines the
court's extension of the felony-murder statute in Jackson and
describes how the court used the state's common law and statutory
felony-murder rules together to elevate the homicide to murder in
the first degree.

1. Common law murder is the unlawful, malicious killing of a human being.
Under the felony-murder rule, malice may be shown by evidence of an
unmitigated, unexcused, unjustified homicide committed in the perpetration of,
or attempt to perpetrate, a felony. Malice may also be shown by evidence of a
homicide caused by the wilful commission of an act, the natural tendency of
which is to cause death or great bodily harm. See W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL,
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES § 10.04, at 628 (7th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited
as

CLARK & MARSHALL].

2. Maryland's felony-murder statute provides:
All murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate, any rape in any degree, sexual offense in the first or
second degree, sodomy, mayhem, robbery, burglary, kidnapping . ..,
storehouse breaking . . ., or daytime housebreaking ..., or in the
escape or attempt to escape from the Maryland Penitentiary, the house
of correction, the Baltimore City jail, or from any jail or penal
institution in any of the counties of this State, shall be murder in the
first degree.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (Supp. 1980).
Under the felony-murder statute, the state need not show premeditation or
intent to kill. State v. Frye, 283 Md. 709, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978). See Newton v.
State, 280 Md. 260, 373 A.2d 262 (1977) in which the court of appeals asserted:
[T~o secure a conviction for first degree murder under the felony murder
doctrine, the State is required to prove the underlying felony and the death
occurring in the perpetration of the felony." Id. at 269, 373 A.2d at 267.
3. See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975); Lipscomb v.
State, 223 Md. 599, 165 A.2d 918 (1960).
Accomplices are equally culpable for a murder committed by a co-felon in
furtherance of the common scheme of a felony. Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App.
640, 643-44, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974).
4. 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
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I.

Jackson v. State

THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF JACKSON v. STATE

William Henry Jackson and James Wells, Jr., walked into an
Ellicott City jewelry store and, brandishing handguns, forced the two
storekeepers to lie on the floor.' The robbers then appropriated
jewelry worth over ten thousand dollars from the store's display
cases and safe. When the police arrived, the robbers tried to leave7
the store, but quickly retreated upon finding police at both exits.
Using the storekeepers as human shields,8 the felons exited through
the rear door, forced the hostages into a police vehicle, and drove off
with the police in pursuit.'
The getaway car was finally stopped by a roadblock in Baltimore
County. Police manning the roadblock, apparently unaware that
hostages were in the car, began firing. Maryland state police and
officers from Baltimore City, Baltimore County, and Howard County
converged on the scene and joined in the shooting. 10 One officer,
carrying a shotgun, ran toward the felons' vehicle. As he leapt onto
the hood of the getaway car, he saw Wells waving a gun from one of
the windows. Attempting to knock the gun out of the felon's hand,
the police officer swung his shotgun across the roof of the car. The
shotgun discharged and mortally wounded one of the hostages,
Bernard Sugar, who was lying on the front seat of the car."
Jackson and Wells both pleaded guilty in circuit court to the
charge of first-degree murder. 2 To support the pleas, the state
5. Id. at 432, 408 A.2d at 713.
6. Id. About thirty minutes into the robbery, a woman entered the store and asked
to see one of the shopkeepers, Mrs. Farber. Wells told the woman that Mrs.
Farber was gone, but would return in half an hour. The woman left, but was
suspicious of Wells' response. She called the police, who arrived about five
minutes later. Id. at 432-33, 408 A.2d at 713.
7. Id. at 433, 408 A.2d at 713.
8. Wells grasped one of the storekeepers in a headlock, placed his gun to her neck,
and said, "You do what I do. I walk, you walk, I run, you run. If they shoot me,
you're dead. If they shoot me, I'm going to kill you." Jackson grabbed the other
storekeeper. Id. at 433, 408 A.2d at 713-14.
9. During the chase, Wells forced his hostage to kneel on the back seat with her
face in the rear window, exposing her to gunfire from the pursuing police. Id. at
433, 408 A.2d at 714.
10. Id. at 434, 408 A.2d at 714; Record at 15.
11. 286 Md. 430, 434, 408 A.2d 711, 714 (1979). After shooting the hostage, the
police captured the felons. Officers found two handguns in and near the
getaway vehicle. One was fully loaded, the other had been fired once. Id.
12. Originally brought in Baltimore County Circuit Court, the case was transferred
for trial to Worcester County in accordance with Maryland Rule 744. Id. at 431,
408 A.2d at 713. Rule 744 allows for the transfer of criminal proceedings to
another court having jurisdiction. Md. Rule 744.
The defendants pleaded guilty to first-degree murder in return for the
state's agreement to recommend life imprisonment for the murder and to nol
pros all other charges against the defendants relating to the incident. 286 Md.
430, 432, 401 A.2d 711, 713 (1979). Arguably, the state could have asked for
the death penalty. The Maryland statute governing sentencing for first-degree
murder describes aggravating circumstances to be considered by the court or
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proffered evidence demonstrating the defendants' guilt.1

3

The trial

judge accepted the guilty pleas 4 and, relying on Maryland's
felony-murder statute, found each defendant guilty of murder in the
first degree.1 5 The judge sentenced Jackson and Wells to life
imprisonment."

On direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
affirmed the conviction. The intermediate appellate court agreed
the jury in determining whether to sentence a defendant to death or life
imprisonment. Two such aggravating circumstances are:
(3) The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an
escape or an attempt to escape from or evade the lawful custody, arrest,
or detention of or by an officer or guard of a correctional institution or
by a law enforcement officer.
(4) The victim was a hostage taken or attempted to be taken in
the course of a kidnapping or abduction or an attempt to kidnap or
abduct.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(d)(3)-(4) (Supp. 1980). If the court or jury found
either or both of these aggravating circumstances to exist, the trier of fact
would also be required to weigh that factor against any mitigating circumstances. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g) (Supp. 1980). One such circumstance
is: "The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's
death." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(g)(6) (Supp. 1980). Only if the trier of fact
found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances
would the sentence be death. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 413(h)(2)-(3) (Supp.
1980).
13. 286 Md. 430, 432, 408 A.2d 711, 713 (1979). The state's proffer is summarized
in notes 5-11 and accompanying text supra.
14. "The [trial] court, through extensive inquiry of the defendants, placed on the
record an affirmative showing that the plea of each of them was made
voluntarily, unconditionally, and with an intelligent understanding of the
nature of the offense and the possible consequences of the effect of the pleas."
Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 432, 408 A.2d 711, 713 (1979). By placing this
information on the record, the trial court showed that the defendants waived
their consitutional rights to trial by jury, to face their accusers, and to be free
from compulsory self-incrimination. See Williams v. State, 10 Md. App. 570,
571-74, 271 A.2d 777, 778-80 (1970), cert. denied, 261 Md. 730 (1971).
15. Record at 27-28, Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979). For the
text of Maryland's felony-murder statute, see note 2 supra. The trial judge told
the defendants:
[Elven though the fatal shot was not fired by either of you, .

it was

you who triggered the entire episode, and it was as a result of your
criminal conduct, your robbery of this store

. .

.

that [the storekeeper]

died.
I think any jury would have found you guilty of murder in the first
degree, and, of course, you would have been found guilty, unquestionably, of the kidnapping charges. You have run afoul of the felony/
murder rule in Maryland. And if one is killed as a result of the
perpetration of a crime the character in which you two perpetrated in
Ellicott City, then you are guilty of murder in the first degree.
Record at 27. Although the trial judge found that the robbery was the
underlying felony in the case, the court of appeals found the kidnapping to be
the underlying felony for the felony-murder conviction. 286 Md. 430, 435 n.3,
408 A.2d 711, 714-15 n.3 (1979).
16. 286 Md. 430, 431, 408 A.2d 711, 713 (1979).
17. Jackson v. State, No. 681 Sept. Term 1978 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 16, 1979).
For a summary of the defendants' argument on appeal, see note 57 and
accompanying text infra.

Jackson v. State
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with the trial court that the state's factual statement supported the
conviction, ruling that "'[e]ven an unintentional, an unplanned, an
unparticipated-in death that occurs in the course of a felony is, by
statutory definition, murder in the first degree.' "18 The court of
appeals affirmed.19
II. THE FELONY-MURDER RULE
Common law murder is criminal homicide committed with
malice aforethought.' The state may use any of the following
common law theories to prove malice: 21 the defendant killed with the
intent to do so (express malice);22 the killer acted with a "depraved
heart" - a reckless disregard for human life (implied malice);23 or,
under the felony-murder rule, the2 4death occurred in the perpetration
of a felony (constructive malice).
At early English common law, whenever a person acting
unlawfully killed another person, that homicide was murder. 5 The
commission of the unlawful act established the element of malice
necessary for murder. 2 As the law evolved, English courts required
18. Id., slip op. at E.3 (quoting Middleton v. State, 6 Md. App. 380, 385, 251 A.2d
224, 227 (1969)). Note that the appellant in Middleton was an accomplice of the
person who actually killed the victim, thus distinguishing the quoted case from
Jackson.
19. Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
20. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 10.04 at 628.
21. See Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 696-97, 349 A.2d 300, 335-36 (1975),
aff'd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976).
22. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 10.04 at 628.
23. W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 541-45 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as LAFAVE & SCOTT]. "Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a
reasonable man would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very
high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another . . . which
actually causes death, may constitute murder." Id. at 541.
24. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 10.07 at 656. In order to prove the
commission of the felony, the state must show that the defendant committed
the crime with a felonious mens rea - a guilty state of mind. When a homicide
results from the commission of the felony, the common law applies the
felonious mens rea to the homicide and thereby imputes or "constructs" the
malice required to support a murder conviction. Id.
For a discussion of the malice required to raise a homicide to murder, see
Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 689-700, 349 A.2d 300, 332-37 (1975), aff'd,
278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). Historically, proof that the defendant
intended to kill the victim established express malice and thereby raised the
homicide to murder. Later, the courts began to infer the intent to kill from
other, non-homicidal intents of the defendant, such as the intent to do grievous
bodily harm, the intent to commit a felony, or the intent to commit an act,
almost certain to cause death or serious bodily harm, with wanton and wilful
disregard for human life. Id. at 696, 349 A.2d at 335.
25. E. COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 56 (6th ed.
1680).
26. Id. The felony-murder rule is not a rule of causation, but a legal fiction used to
impute malice. See Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of

Others, 105 U.

PA.

L.

REV.

50, 58-64 (1956).
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the defendant's unlawful act to be a felony before he could be found
guilty of murder.27 Because all felonies were subject to capital
punishment," application of the felony-murder rule mattered little to
the condemned felon. Hanging for the underlying felony was
virtually indistinguishable from hanging for murder. The common
law felony-murder rule is still in effect except in jurisdictions in
which it has been abrogated by statute. 9
Maryland's felony-murder statute did not abrogate the common
law rule. 30 The Maryland statutes describing murder 3' neither
created new crimes nor altered the common law definition of murder,

27. M. FOSTER, CROWN LAW 258 (2d ed. 1791).
28. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98, *216, *222.
29. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 10.07 at 657. The felony-murder rule has
been abolished by statute in England (Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c.11,
§ 1), and in the states of Hawaii (HAWAII REV. STAT. § 707-701 note (1976)
(Felony-Murder Rule)), Michigan (see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 209
N.W.2d 304 (1980)), and Kentucky (Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 500.020 (Baldwin
1975) (abolishing all common law offenses in Kentucky)). Kentucky has a
felony-murder statute which raises statutorily-defined murder to a capital
offense when "[tihe defendant's act of killing was intentional, and occurred
during the commission of" one of the enumerated felonies (arson, robbery,
burglary, or rape). Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020 (Baldwin 1975).
30. See, e.g., Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 260, 146 A.2d 17, 20 (1958). The
court of appeals in Jackson, however, cited Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. App. 100,
105 n.6, 258 A.2d 760, 763 n.6 (1969), cert. denied, 257 Md. 734 (1970) for the
suggestion that the common law felony-murder rule was eventually narrowed
to require that the underlying felony be one dangerous to human life. 286 Md.
430, 435 n.3, 408 A.2d 711, 714-15 n.3 (1979). The rule appears to have been
narrowed in Maryland to apply only to those felonies enumerated in the
felony-murder statute. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 410 (Supp. 1980). See Jeter v.
State, 9 Md. App. 575, 578, 267 A.2d 319, 321 (1970), in which the court of
special appeals assumed that the felony-murder rule did not apply to the case
because the underlying felony was not then enumerated in the statute.
Arguably, the enumerated felonies are those that are inherently dangerous to
human life. Because the court of appeals fofind the underlying felony in
Jackson to be kidnapping, a felony inherently dangerous to human life, the
court found it unnecessary to decide "whether the qualification was recognized
when the common law of England was constitutionally incorporated into
[Maryland] law." 286 Md. at 435 n.3, 408 A.2d at 714-15 n.3. See MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGHTS art. 5.
31. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 407-411 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Section 407 reads: "All

murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or by
any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing shall be murder in the
first degree." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 407 (1976). Under the felony-murder
statute, § 410, the commission of the felony is not a substitute for premeditation. Instead, the felony-murder statute describes circumstances other than
premeditated murder under which the state legislature has determined that
murder should be in the first degree. Newton v. State, 280 Md. 260, 268-69,
373 A.2d 262, 266-67 (1977).
Section 408 of article 27 makes "[a]ll murder which shall be committed in
the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate any arson" first-degree murder
and § 409 makes all murder committed in the burning or attempting to burn
any barn or similar structure containing livestock or goods murder in the first
degree. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408, 409 (1976). Section 411 deems all
murder not covered in §§ 407-410 to be second-degree murder. MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 411 (1976).
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but merely divided common law murder into degrees for purposes of
sentencing.2 In enacting the first-degree murder statutes, the
General Assembly spelled out the circumstances under which a
murder is deemed so atrocious that capital punishment is
appropriate. 33 When the murder is not committed under any of the
enumerated circumstances, it is in the second degree, and the
punishment is mitigated. 34 The felony-murder statute therefore
represents the legislature's attempt to graduate the measure of
punishment meted out to felons found guilty of murder under the
common law felony-murder rule.3 5 Only those murders committed in
the perpetration of one of the enumerated felonies are murder in the
first degree. 6
In order to secure a first-degree murder conviction under
Maryland's felony-murder statute, the state must show that the
felon committed criminal homicide in the course of committing or
attempting to commit one of the enumerated felonies. 37 Maryland
courts have many times found defendants guilty of first-degree
murder under the state's felony-murder statute when the felon or
co-felon killed the victim. 38 Before Jackson v. State,39 however, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland had never had the opportunity to
review a felony-murder conviction in a case in which the lethal blow
40
was inflicted, not by the felon, but by a person resisting the felony.
Other jurisdictions have encountered such cases, with widely
varying results.4' Conviction or acquittal of a felony-murder charge
generally depended upon whether the court adopted the agency or
causation theory of felony-murder.
Under the agency theory, the felony-murder rule applies only
when the defendant or his co-felon actually strikes the fatal blow or

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

E.g., Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 260, 146 A.2d 17, 20 (1958).
See Davis v. State, 39 Md. 355 (1874).
See id. at 375.
See Stansbury v. State, 218 Md. 255, 260, 146 A.2d 17, 20 (1958).
For the text of Maryland's felony-murder statute, including the enumerated
felonies, see note 2 supra. Two other first-degree murder statutes in Maryland
also are based on the felony-murder rule. Sections 408 and 409 of article 27,
described in note 31 supra, make murder committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate any arson or storehouse burning murder in the first
degree. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 408, 409 (1976).
State v. Frye, 283 Md. 260, 393 A.2d 1372 (1978); Newton v. State, 280 Md.
709, 373 A.2d 262 (1977). The state must also show a direct causal relationship
between the felony and the homicide. Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640,
643-44, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974).
See, e.g., Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 345 A.2d 830 (1975); Lipscomb v.
State, 223 Md. 599, 165 A.2d 918 (1960); Shockley v. State, 218 Md. 491, 148
A.2d 371 (1959); Brooks v. State, 2 Md. App. 291, 234 A.2d 467 (1967).
286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
Brief for Appellee at 6, Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711 (1979).
See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 239 (1974) and cases collected therein.
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fires the fatal shot.42 If the fatal act is committed by a third party,
the felon will not be held culpable for the homicide 43 The California
Supreme Court, rejecting a felony-murider conviction under a statute
substantially the same as Maryland's, 44 ruled: "When a killing is not
committed by a robber or by his accomplice . . . malice aforethought

is not attributable to the robber, for the killing is not committed by
him in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate robbery. '45 Because
it was not committed with malice, the killing was not murder. The
California court reasoned that to include such a homicide within the
state's felony-murder statute would expand beyond common understanding the meaning of "murder committed in the perpetration of"
46
a felony.
Other courts have rejected the agency rule and adopted a theory
based on proximate causation. 47 Under this theory, the felonymurder rule applies whenever the defendant, by committing a
felony, sets into motion a series of events that results in a homicide
and there is no intervening cause. 48 The fact that the felon did not
actually strike the fatal blow is no defense to felony-murder under
the causation theory.49 Some courts temper this rule by requiring

42. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1970); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505, 209 N.E.2d 308 (1965).
Occasionally, the language of a state's felony-murder statute will dictate
the adoption of the agency theory by the courts of that state. For example,
Mississippi's Code provides:
The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any
means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases:

43.
44.

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

(c) When done without any design to effect death by any person
engaged in the commission of any felony [other than certain enumerated
felonies] ....
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1980) (emphasis added).
E.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970);
see Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 239, 249-52 (1974) and cases collected therein.
The California murder statute contains the provision: "All murder... which
is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape,
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or [lewd acts with a child], is murder in the first
degree . . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 (West 1970 & Supp. 1980).
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442,
445 (1965).
Id. Although the California courts have held that a felon may not be convicted
under that state's felony-murder statute unless he actually strikes the fatal
blow, a defendant may nevertheless be held accountable for murder if he
committed an act likely to cause death with a reckless disregard for human life,
and death in fact resulted. See, e.g., People v. Reed, 270 Cal. App. 2d 37, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 430 (1969).
See, e.g., People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974); People v.
Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 845 (1952); State
v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979).
See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 239, .252-56 (1974).
E.g., State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979).
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that the death be reasonably foreseeable."0 The rule that a man is
criminally liable for the foreseeable deaths he causes is supported by
Blackstone: "If a man however does such an act, of which the
probable consequence may be, and eventually is, death; such killing
may be murder, although no stroke be struck by himself, and no
killing may be primarily intended . . ...
" The Michigan Supreme
Court, quoting Blackstone, held that the murder conviction of a
defendant who did not actually fire the fatal shot "can be considered
to be within the principles of the common law, notwithstanding the
fact that the fatal bullet was fired by an officer."52
Courts have upheld murder convictions, even in jurisdictions
that follow the agency theory, in cases in which the felon used his
hostage as a human shield or otherwise placed the hostage in a
position of danger to deter police from firing for fear of injuring the
hostage.5 3 These cases, however, were not necessarily decided under
the felony-murder rule.54 In "human shield" cases, the courts often
look to the felon's act of placing the victim in a position of known
grave danger, not the underlying felony, to prove the malice
necessary for a murder conviction.55 The factual background of
Jackson was ideal for a decision following the human shield cases in
other jurisdictions. The -trial court, however, convicted the defendants under Maryland's felony-murder statute, and the court of
50. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979). The Supreme Court of
Missouri, noting that some resistance to a robbery was "reasonably foreseeable," ruled that the salient factor in a felony-murder case was not who
actually struck the fatal blow, but "whether the death was the natural and
proximate result" of the felon's actions. Id. at 752. See generally 1 F. WHARTON,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1978).
51. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *197. Blackstone was not referring to
felony-murder, but to negligent murder, as indicated by his discussion of acts
other than felonies which directly caused the death of a victim. Blackstone's
rule refers to the causal connection between the action of the defendant and the
homicide. Because the felony-murder rule imputes malice, and is not a rule of
causation, application of Blackstone's rule to felony-murder is inappropriate.
See Morris, The Felons Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others, 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 50, 58-64 (1956). For Blackstone's discussion of the felony-murder rule,
see 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *192-93, *200-01.
52. People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 511-12, 52 N.W.2d 201, 205, cert. denied,
344 U.S. 845 (1952). But see People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 209 N.W.2d 304
(1980).
53. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1115, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972); Pizano v.
Superior Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d 659, 145 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1978); State v.
Kress, 105 N.J. Super. 514, 253 A.2d 481 (1969).
54. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970);
Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 239, 261-63 (1974) and cases cited therein.
55. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1115, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972); Pizano v.
Superior Ct., 21 Cal. 3d 128, 577 P.2d 659, 145 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1978). But see
State v. Kress, 105 N.J. Super. 514, 253 A.2d 481 (1969), a human shield case
in which the court refused to quash an indictment for murder on the grounds
that the case was encompassed by the New Jersey murder statute, which
included a felony-murder provision. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:113-1 (West
1952) (repealed by N.J. Laws, ch. 95 (1978)).
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appeals was therefore required to determine whether the felonymurder rule was applicable.
III. THE JACKSON DECISION
Because Jackson and Wells pleaded guilty to murder in the first
degree, the only issue before the Court of Appeals of Maryland was
whether the prosecution had established a sufficient factual foundation to substantiate the plea.5 6 The defendants contended on appeal
that, because they did not fire the fatal shot, the facts proffered by
the state at trial were insufficient to prove every element of
first-degree murder, and the trial court therefore improperly
accepted their pleas of guilty to that offense.5 7 The state argued that
the evidence proffered at trial proved first-degree murder under the
causation theory of felony-murder, notwithstanding the fact that the
victim was shot by a police officer attempting to apprehend the
defendants. 58
The court of appeals noted that, at common law, "homicide
arising in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, a
felony is murder whether death was intended or not, the fact that
the person was engaged in such perpetration or attempt being
sufficient to supply the element of malice.

5

9

Because malice was

established by the commission of the felony, the killing of the
storekeeper was murder if it was committed by Jackson and Wells in
the perpetration of that felony. The questict, as the court saw it, was
one of "causal relationship."6 If the state's proffer of evidence proved
that Jackson and Wells caused the homicide in perpetration of a
felony enumerated in the felony-murder statute, then the state's
evidence established a factual basis sufficient to support the pleas of
guilty to first-degree murder.
Applying the rationale of three similar cases in other states,."
the court of appeals concluded that the felons did in fact cause the
56. Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 431, 408 A.2d 711, 713 (1979); see Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
57. See Brief for Appellants at 5-6, Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711
(1979). A conviction based upon a guilty plea is derived from an admission of
conduct. The conduct that the defendant has admitted, which is often described
in a statement of facts proffered by the state and agreed to by the defense at
trial, must satisfy every element of the offense charged before a guilty verdict
may be upheld. Williams v. State, 10 Md. App. 570, 271 A.2d 777 (1970), cert.
denied, 261 Md. 730 (1971). See Md. Rule 731(c).
58. See Brief for Appellee at 3, 8, 12, Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 408 A.2d 711
(1979). For a summary of the state's proffered evidence, see notes 5-11 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 286 Md. 430, 435, 408 A.2d 711, 715 (1979). Accord, Stansbury v. State, 218
Md. 255, 146 A.2d 17 (1958).
60. 286 Md. 430, 436-37, 408 A.2d 711, 715 (1979).
61. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex.
Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961
(1900).
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storekeeper's death.62 The court particularly stressed the conclusion
of the Supreme Court of Arkansas in Wilson v. State,63 a case
factually analogous to Jackson. In Wilson, the defendant used his
robbery victim as a human shield while attempting to escape
capture.6 The Arkansas court ruled that the felon's "action in forcing
[the victim] to a place which was known by him to be perilous was
just as much the cause of his death as if he had himself fired the
fatal shot. ' 65 In the other two cases relied on by the court in Jackson,
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals upheld first-degree murder
convictions of train robbers who put their victim in a dangerous
place, where he was shot and killed by a passenger trying to halt the
felony.' By using their hostages as human shields, the defendants in
Jackson also placed their victim in a perilous position where they
should have foreseen the possibility of the hostage being killed or
seriously injured. Therefore, the court of appeals reasoned that
"[tihey were just as much the cause of [the storekeeper's] death as if
each had fired the fatal shot."6 7
The court of appeals bolstered its conclusion that the death of
the storekeeper was attributable to the defendants by examining
causation in terms of sine qua non: "but for" the defendants' conduct
the storekeeper would not have been killed.6 Although the fatal shot
was fired by the police officer, the court ruled that the action of that
officer was caused by the conduct of the felons.6 9 In addition, the
court found that the result of the defendants' felonious behavior was
foreseeable and that "[tihe causal relationship between the acts of
Jackson and Wells and the death of [the storekeeper] for which they
were prosecuted [was] clear and direct."7 °
Because the felons caused the killing, and they had neither
justification nor excuse for this act, the court reasoned that the
defendants were criminally liable for the homicide. 71 Further, as the
commission of the felony of kidnapping established malice, the
criminal homicide was murder under the common law felony-murder

62. 286 Md. 430, 442, 408 A.2d 711, 718 (1979).
63. 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934).
64. Id. at 847-48, 68 S.W.2d at 100.
65. Id. at 853, 68 S.W.2d at 102.
66. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41
Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
67. 286 Md. 430, 442, 408 A.2d 711, 718 (1979).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. The court was unclear regarding exactly what felonious behavior made the
fatal result foreseeable. Although the court determined that the underlying
felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule was the kidnapping, it also
described the rest of the felons' behavior, from the initial robbery to the final
shoot-out, in the discussion of causation and foreseeability. See id.
71. Id. at 436, 408 A.2d at 715.
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rule. 72 In light of Maryland's felony-murder statute, the murder was
in the first degree because it was committed during the perpetration
of kidnapping, one of the statute's enumerated felonies.73 The court of
appeals concluded that the state had proved the corpus delicti of
first-degree murder for which the defendants entered guilty pleas at
trial, and that the trial court had acted properly in accepting the
pleas.74
IV. EVALUATION OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
In affirming the first-degree murder convictions of Jackson and
Wells, the court of appeals relied on the common law felony-murder
rule and Maryland's felony-murder statute.75 The court also adopted
the causation theory of felony-murder, holding that the felons could
be held culpable for the murder only if they caused the victim's
death. 76 Implicit in the causation theory of the felony-murder rule is
the requirement of a causal link between the harm done (the
homicide) and the felony on which the murder conviction is based.7 7
Although it found a causal connection between the conduct of the
felons and the resulting homicide, the court of appeals in Jackson
failed to show that the felony itself caused the victim's death.
Instead, the court found that the felons caused the homicide by using
their victim as a human shield and placing him in a position of
known grave danger. As heinous as this conduct appears, such
conduct is not a felony as described either by the common law or
statutory felony-murder rules.7 8 Therefore, the use of the felonymurder rule in deciding the Jackson case was inappropriate.
The requirement of a causal link between the felony and the
resulting homicide is rooted in a basic theory of criminal law.
Generally, a person is not considered criminally culpable for
wrongful conduct unless he acts with a "guilty mind."79 For the
conduct to be criminal, the guilty mind (mens rea) must concur with

72. Id.
73. Id. The court attributed the crime to both Jackson and Wells because they were
jointly engaged in the felonies and, therefore, were each responsible for all
consequences that naturally and necessarily flowed from the acts of each
participant. Id. at 443, 408 A.2d at 719. See Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640,
313 A.2d 563 (1974).
74. 286 Md. 430, 444, 408 A.2d 711, 719 (1979).
75. Id. at 435-36, 408 A.2d at 714-15.
76. Id. at 443, 408 A.2d at 719.
77. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 23, at 264. See Mumford v. State, 19 Md. App. 640,
643-44, 313 A.2d 563, 566 (1974). Cf. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 44 (2d ed. 1969)
("Homicide is murder if the death results from the perpetration of an
inherently dangerous felony.").
78. See note 2 supra.
79. 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1978); see also
Morrisette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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the criminal conduct (actus reus)8 0 The very definition of murder criminal homicide committed with malice aforethought"! - exempli82
fies the necessity that the actus reus concur with the mens rea.
Under the felony-murder rule, the actus reus is the conduct
causing the homicide.' The mens rea is established by the defendant's commission of the felony upon which the felony-murder charge
isbased. 4 Concurrence of actus reus and mens rea in a felonymurder case, therefore, requires the conduct causing the homicide to
be the underlying felony. Because the court in Jackson determined
that the underlying felony was the kidnapping, 85 the defendants
were guilty of felony-murder only if the commission of the kidnapping caused the homicide.
The court in Jackson failed to establish a causal link between
the commission of the kidnapping alone and the death of the victim.
The language used in the decision indicates that the court relied not
on the kidnapping, but on other conduct of the felons to establish the
actus reus necessary for a murder conviction:
"[Blut for" the acts of Jackson and Wells - committing the
armed robbery, kidnapping [the storekeepers] to use them as
hostages, forcing them against their will into a position of
known grave danger, attempting to elude apprehension by
fleeing in stolen automobiles, all the while purposely
exposing their hostages to gunfire, and, when ultimately
halted in their flight by police action, resisting arrest - "but
for" those acts, [the storekeeper] would not have been
killed. 6
The conduct of the felons that caused the homicide was not the mere
commission of the kidnapping or the robbery. The homicide was
more directly linked to the felons' additional actions: exposing the
80. 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1978). See also
Jackson v. State, 102 Ala. 167, 15 So. 344 (1894); Wilson v. State, 96 Ark. 148,
131 S.W. 336 (1910); State v. Sandborn, 120 Me. 170, 130 A. 54 (1921); Sykes v.
State, 291 So. 2d 697 (Miss. 1974).
The term "actus reus" has been used by authorities alternatively to
designate the conduct causing the harmful result, the harmful result of the
conduct, and both the harm and the conduct causing it. See J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 222-25 (2d ed. 1960). In this casenote, "actus reus"
is used to designate the conduct causing the harmful result.
81. CLARK & MARSHALL, supra note 1, § 10.04 at 628.
82. The court in Jackson defined murder as criminal homicide committed with
malice aforethought, but did not discuss the necessity that the two elements
occur contemporaneously. See Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 435, 408 A.2d
711, 714 (1979).
83. See discussion of actus reus at note 80 supra.
84. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 45 (2d ed. 1969).
85. 286 Md. 430, 435 n.3, 408 A.2d 711, 714-15 n.3 (1979).
86. Id. at 442, 408 A.2d at 718.

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 9

storekeeper to police gunfire, forcing him into a place of grave
danger, and resisting arrest.
The cases upon which the court of appeals in Jackson relied
illustrate that the court considered more than the underlying felony
to establish the causal connection between the defendants' conduct
and the homicide. The court discussed three cases from other
jurisdictions -

two from Texas and one from Arkansas 7 -

which

were based on factual situations similar to Jackson. In the Texas
cases, the felons placed their victim in an obviously dangerous
position where the victim was shot and killed by parties trying to
stop the felons." In the Arkansas case, the victim, who was being
used as a human shield by the felon fleeing a robbery, was
accidentally shot and killed by a peace officer."9 In effect, the courts
in Texas and Arkansas considered the defendants' acts of placing
their victims in the path of oncoming bullets, which the defendants
knew were likely to be fired, as the basis for holding that the
defendants caused the homicides.90 By following the rationale of
these cases to establish causation, the court of appeals in Jackson
indicated that it relied on more than the mere commission of the
felony to establish a causal connection between the defendants'
conduct and the homicide.
Other language of the court of appeals indicates that the court
did not even consider the felonies in finding a causal link between
the defendants' conduct and the homicide. The court cited Wharton's
CriminalLaw for the suggestion that:
[T]he general rule is that the defendant is not responsible for
a death caused by the shots of a police officer, but that "[t]he
general rule recognizes two exceptions in which the felon is
guilty of first degree murder, namely, when he uses the

87. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d 100 (1934); Keaton v. State, 41 Tex.
Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961
(1900).
88. In neither of these cases, which arose out of the same train robbery, did the
Texas court find a causal link between the felony and the homicide. Instead,
the court likened the actions of the defendants to leading a blind man to a
precipice where he falls and is killed. The homicidal act of the defendants was
placing the victim in a position of known danger, not the commission of the
felony. Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 630, 57 S.W. 1125, 1129 (1900);
Taylor v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 564, 570-71, 55 S.W. 961, 964 (1900).
89. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 847, 68 S.W.2d 100, 102 (1934). The Arkansas
court did not use the felony-murder rule to affirm the defendant's conviction.
Instead, the court found the defendant's act of using the victim as a
"breastwork" to ward off hostile gunfire sufficient to uphold the murder
conviction. Id. See Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1115, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972).
90. Johnson v. State, 252 Ark. 1115, 482 S.W.2d 600 (1972); Commonwealth ex rel.
Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
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victim as a shield, and when he compels the victim to occupy
a place or position of danger." 91
The Jackson court, however, disagreed with Wharton's assertion
that the described circumstances are exceptions to any general rule. 9
Instead, the court of appeals found that the felon's acts "establish[ed]
a causal relationship with the harm sustained sufficient to make the
felon criminally liable."'93 The court thus concluded that the homicide
resulted not from the commission of the underlying felony, but from
the felon's additional wanton and reckless conduct.
The concurrence of the malice and the conduct that caused the
homicide is critical to the conclusion that the homicide was murder.
Only if the kidnapping alone had been the proximate cause of the
homicide would the malice established by the commission of that
felony have coincided with the conduct causing the death. Because
the proximate cause of the homicide was not merely the kidnapping,
but rather the defendants' entire course of conduct, including using
the hostages as human shields and knowingly placing them in a
position of known grave danger, the malice established by the
commission of the kidnapping did not coincide with the defendants'
acts that caused the homicide. Without contemporaneous actus reus
and mens rea, the criminal homicide was not felony-murder as
defined at common law.94 Therefore, the felony-murder statute was
inapplicable.
If the Jackson court had applied the depraved heart theory of
murder to establish malice, 95 the defendants' homicidal conduct
would have been concurrent with their criminal state of mind. Under
the depraved heart theory, the court could establish malice by
showing that the defendants acted with reckless disregard for
human life. 96 The acts of Jackson and Wells, using their hostages as
91. Jackson v. State, 286 Md. 430, 443 n.5, 408 A.2d 711, 719 n.5 (1979) (quoting 1
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 253 (R. Anderson ed. 1957)).
Wharton cited as authority for the exceptions to the general rule the same
Arkansas and Texas cases that the Maryland court relied on in convicting the
defendants in Jackson of felony-murder. Id. at 548 nn.15 & 16.
92. 286 Md. 430, 443 n.5, 408 A.2d 711, 719 n.5 (1979).
93. Id.
94. 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 27 (14th ed. C. Torcia 1978) and cases
therein.
95. See Evans v. State, 28 Md. App. 640, 696-97, 349 A.2d 300, 335-36 (1975),
affd, 278 Md. 197, 362 A.2d 629 (1976). In Evans, Judge Moylan stated that
depraved heart murder as developed at common law is today a part of
Maryland substantive law. Accord, Lindsay v. State, 8 Md. App. 100, 104-05,
258 A.2d 760, 763-64 (1969), cert. denied, 257 Md. 734 (1970). See generally
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 23, at 541-45.
96. This course has been followed in California. When someone has been killed by a
non-felon during a felony, the California courts have considered whether the
defendant's conduct in addition to the felony established malice. See, e.g.,
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
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human shields, showed that the defendants acted with a reckless
disregard for the victim's life. This conduct -established the element
of malice necessary for a murder conviction. -As the court in Jackson
demonstrated, the defendants' use of their victim as a human shield
caused the homicide. 7 Therefore, under the depraved heart theory,
the same act - using the hostage as a human shield - could have
been used to establish both the malice and the conduct causing the
harm, and the mens rea would have been concurrent with the actus
reus.
The court, however, could not have upheld a first-degree murder
conviction based on the depraved heart theory of murder. Such a
crime is not described in any of Maryland's first-degree murder
statutes." Instead, the murder would be in the second degree. 99 Even
though the court of appeals would have had to reverse and remand
Jackson, a decision based on the depraved heart theory to prove
malice would have more narrowly defined the issue underlying the
decision in Jackson: whether a felon who uses his victim as a human
shield during the course of a felony is culpable for first-degree
murder if someone accidentally kills that victim in an attempt to
capture the felon. A decision based on the depraved heart theory
would also enjoy stronger legal support, because both the actus reus
and mens rea upon which the convictions would be based are
evidenced by the same conduct and therefore are concurrent.
V.

CONCLUSION

By finding the defendants in Jackson guilty of murder, the
Court of Appeals of Maryland joined virtually every other court that
has contemplated similar "human shield" cases. 0 0 Whenever a felon
uses an innocent person as a shield while perpetrating a felony, the
felon is guilty of murder if that innocent person is killed by anyone
resisting the felony or attempting to capture the felon. In relying on
the felony-murder statute to uphold the first-degree murder convictions in Jackson, Maryland's highest court indicated that it will also
apply the statute to cases in which no human shield is involved. The
court of appeals did not clearly establish a causal relationship
between the commission of the underlying felony and the homicide
for which the felons in Jackson were prosecuted. Instead, the court
found that the felons' conduct in addition to the commission of the
97. See text accompanying notes 86-92 supra.
98. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 407-410 (1976 & Supp. 1980). Maryland's
first-degree murder statutes are described in note 31 supra.
99. Maryland's second-degree murder statute makes all murder not statutorily
described in the first-degree murder statutes murder in the second degree. See
MD.ANN. CODE art. 27, § 411 (1976).
100. See 56 A.L.R.3d 239, 261-63 (1974) and cases cited therein.
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felony caused the death of the victim. In finding that this causal
connection between the felons' conduct and the homicide was
sufficient to invoke the felony-murder statute, the court indicated
that it will probably uphold first-degree murder convictions whenever the defendant, while committing a felony, causes the death of
another person, even if the causal connection between the commission of the felony and the homicide is tenuous."'
John A. Roberts
101. By failing to require a stronger causal link between the underlying felony and
the homicide, the court has opened the door for felony-murder convictions
whenever a homicide might arguably have resulted from a felony, even if that
homicide is remote in time and place from the felony. For example, a Baltimore
criminal court jury recently found a felon guilty of first-degree felony-murder
for the death of an accomplice who was shot by the robbery victim. State v.
Freeman, The Evening Sun, Oct. 14, 1980, at D2, col. 2 (Baltimore City Crim.
Ct., No. 180-193-20, filed Oct. 7, 1980). In Freeman, the defendant robbed an
apartment dweller. After the robber left the apartment, the victim got a gun
and fired from his apartment at the robber. One of the shots struck and killed
the robber's accomplice, who was helping to carry away the stolen goods. Id.

